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Abstract 
Recent research has proposed fitting responses from discrete choice experiments to 
asymmetric value functions consistent with prospect theory, taking into account 
respondents’ reference points in their valuation of choice attributes. Previous studies have 
mainly concentrated on travel time and cost attributes, while evidence regarding road 
safety attributes is very limited.   
This paper investigates the implicit utility of a road safety attribute, defined as the number 
of casualties per year in alternative car trip choices, when safety improves or deteriorates. 
Using appropriate statistical tests we are able to reject symmetric preferences for losses 
and gains in the level of safety and estimate a sigmoid value function that exhibits loss 
aversion and diminishing sensitivity. This adds an interesting psychological dimension to 
the preference of road safety. Possible implications of this finding for policy making are 
discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
The economic valuation of changes in road safety, or fatality and injury risk in road 
transport, constitutes a key input to policymaking on how much to spend on road safety. 
The monetary valuation of road safety is often referred to as the value of preventing a 
statistical fatality or the value of a statistical life (VSL). VSL is the population mean of the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between wealth and mortality risk; that is, the 
monetary value of a “small” mortality risk change that aggregated over the population 
would amount to the prevention (or the increase) of one statistical death (Schelling 1968, 
Mishan 1971). Similarly, values of preventing injuries of different severity, can also be 
established (Jones-Lee 1974, Jones-Lee et al. 1995; Hojman et al. 2005). 
An extensive literature exists regarding the economic valuation of preventing 
fatalities and injuries (Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Rizzi and Ortuzar 2006; Lindhjem et al. 
2011). Most studies have applied stated preference (SP) methods (Carson and Louviere 
2011) that have their theoretical underpinning in standard neo-classical economic theory. 
However, recent research has proposed fitting responses from discrete stated choice (SC) 
experiments to a value function proposed by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, Thaler 1980, see also Malul et al. 2013), taking into account respondents’ reference 
points in their valuation of choice attributes and allowing for asymmetric preferences. De 
Borger and Fosgerau (2008) applied SC data but only with trade-offs between travel time 
and money and tested for reference-dependent preferences. They found that “loss aversion 
plays an important role in explaining responses; moreover, participants were found to be 
more loss averse in the time dimension than in the cost dimension”; they also found 
“evidence of asymmetrically diminishing sensitivity” (p 101). Hjorth and Fosgerau (2012) 
present a similar SC study, also finding that the value function was consistent with 
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prospect theory, exhibiting loss aversion for both travel time and cost. Ramjerdi et al. 
(2010) found the same evidence in the Norwegian Value of Time Study. Masiero and 
Hensher (2010) found that their Swiss SC data on freight transport were much better 
explained when allowing for asymmetric preferences, a steeper utility function for losses 
than for gains; and found that loss aversion was significant for all three attributes 
(punctuality, time and cost). Many of these empirical studies seem to give support for an 
asymmetric value function (and loss aversion) as proposed by prospect theory regarding 
travel time and travel cost.  Evidence regarding road safety attributes is very limited. 
To our knowledge, only Rizzi and Ortúzar (2003) presented a test for reference 
dependency and loss aversion involving road safety. They found only weak indication of 
differences between valuations of safety gains and safety losses. De Blaeij and van Vuuren 
(2003) presented a prospect theory approach to road safety valuation, analysing the form of 
the utility function for safety losses based on a very small pilot sample, but did not assess 
loss aversion. 
This paper contributes to the limited literature on reference dependency and loss 
aversion in discrete choice experiments involving road safety (or casualty risk) by utilizing  
a large dataset (Veisten et al. 2013). The dataset is also  rich in the sense that the reference 
levels are person specific, pivoted to an actual trip described by the respondent (while 
Rizzi and Ortúzar 2003 used a common “pseudo-reference point”, ibid, p. 17).  
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: The next section presents some 
relevant theory regarding value functions. The third section describes the survey, the  
design of the choice experiments (CE), and the loss aversion hypothesis applicable to our 
data. The fourth section provides the results of our analysis. These results are discussed 
and conclusions drawn in the last section. 
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2. Theoretical background 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative value function to the one assumed 
in expected utility theory, the prospect theory-based value function which models the 
changes in utility level (i.e. marginal utility) associated with equal-sized losses and gains 
as asymmetric. More precisely, their value function was (1) defined in terms of changes 
from a reference point, (2) it was concave for gains and convex for losses (decreasing 
marginal values for gains and for losses), and (3) it was steeper for losses than for gains 
(loss aversion). Figure 1 displays this S shaped asymmetric value function. 
 
Figure 1 about here (Caption: “Figure 1: The value function in prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979”) 
 
The functional form of such a value function can be rather simple. Departing from a linear 
and symmetric value function, 𝑉 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋, a modification to: 𝑉 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 ∗
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝜆  + 𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛
𝜆, allows for more flexibility and would be consistent with prospect 
theory if:  
(1) 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = {
𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓 > 𝑋 
0        𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
, 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛 = {
𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝑋  𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓 < 𝑋 
0        𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
 , 
(2) 𝜆 < 1 
and 
(3) |𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠| > |𝛽𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛|,  
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These three conditions correspond to the three characteristics described above (reference 
point (𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑓) dependent utility, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion). Hence, prospect 
theory implies that answers to valuation questions in SP surveys will depend on the 
reference point, which, in the case of safety would be the current level of safety. When 
asked about the compensation needed to offset a reduction in safety, the valuation function 
would be in the domain of losses and display loss aversion, which is akin to the so called 
endowment effect (Thaler 1980, Bateman et al. 1997). Prospect theory, proposing 
asymptotic preferences for road safety, adds an interesting psychological dimension to 
modelling human travel behaviour, compared to traditional neo-classical economic 
assumptions of preferences that are the same, in absolute terms, for gains and losses. 
Prospect theory expands neo-classical theory by arguing for different preferences and 
mind-sets depending on the endowment, that is, the current level of road safety that the 
individual holds when facing a safety change     
In psychology and marketing literature loss aversion is explained by at least four 
components (Paraschiv and L’Haridon 2008): (1) the neural component, that losses and 
gains are processed in different primary areas of the brain; (2) the affective component, 
that persons are (emotionally) attached to what they possess; (3) the cognitive component, 
acknowledging that the cognitive progress prior to transactions differs between 
cession/selling and receiving/buying; and (4) the conative component, explaining loss 
aversion by negative feelings connected to giving up a possession (independent of the 
degree of emotional attachment). The literature underlines that the conative (“possession”) 
component does not have to be strictly related to “real endowment” but can also apply to 
“mental endowment” (Ariely and Simonson 2003). This latter aspect is important in our 
context as road users do not literally own/possess the existing level of road safety (see also 
the discussion in section 5). 
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3. Stated choice experiment design 
3.1 Choices pivoted around reported reference trips 
Preferences for road safety can be elicited by means of choice experiments. In our case, car 
drivers were asked to choose one of two route alternatives characterised by three different 
attributes: cost per trip, travel time per trip and casualties per year (for time and cost, the 
aggregate value per year was also given in parenthesis). Figure 2 presents an example of a 
choice experiment situation used in this survey. The travel alternatives were pivoted 
around a reported reference trip in order to make them as realistic and meaningful as 
possible. The respondents reported the reference values for time and cost. The reference 
value for the number of casualties in car accidents, however, was calculated on the basis of 
the reported reference time and the value of annual average daily traffic (AADT), 
representing traffic density in the route actually chosen by each respondent. 
 
Figure 2 about here (Caption: “Figure 2: Illustration of the pair-wise choice format of CE, 
with three attributes. The example is based on a reference trip of 15 minutes 
(#base_time#), costing 30 Norwegian crowns (#base_cost#), and a stated trip frequency 
per week equal to 10 (simply multiplying by 52 for annual estimates). The casualty 
reference level is calculated as 3 (#base_casualty#) based on an assumed annual average 
daily traffic of about 6,000, as given from Table 2. This is an example of “Choice 1” (of 
the 96 choice types specified in Table A1, in the Appendix), whereby Alternative A has the 
reference level for all three attributes, while Alternative B has “slightly worse” levels for 
time and cost and “much better” level for casualties.”) 
 7 
The safety attribute was presented as the annual expected number of casualties on a 
road trip of a certain length on a road with a stated traffic volume (AADT). The number of 
casualties was estimated by converting the reported trip time on the reference trip to 
kilometres driven, by applying average speeds for car driving on Norwegian roads (i.e. 45 
km/hour, Denstadli et al. 2006), and then adjusted by the AADT estimated for the 
reference trip. Three AADT classes were pre-assigned to respondents based on their 
residence (see Veisten et al. 2013 for details). The estimates were based on representative 
accident rates (accidents per million kilometres of driving) for public roads in Norway in 
the previous decade (Elvik 2008). 
From the reference levels of casualties, five attribute levels were defined (including 
the reference level), for every trip length / AADT class, according to Table 1 (Veisten et 
al. 2013). 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The other two attributes in the SC experiment were travel time and (out-of-pocket) 
trip cost, including fuel and possible toll costs (Ramjerdi et al. 2010). A full-factorial 
design for a SC experiment with three attributes having five levels each would yield 
53=125 choice pairs; this was reduced to 96 choice pairs by removing cases with dominant 
alternatives and with the additional removal of some of the time level changes, following 
De Jong et al. (2007). These 96 choice pairs were blocked into six choices per respondent, 
where the three attributes were related to trip alternatives in the pair-wise choice structure, 
plus an opt-out option. Doing so, one can identify 24 different choice tasks in terms of 
losses and gains relative to the references values (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
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The reference values for the casualty attribute varied from two to 232 casualties, and 
about two thirds of the sample faced choices where the casualty reference value was in the 
range of two to eight; 40% of the reference levels were five or lower, 81% were lower or 
equal to 20, and only 4% of the observations had a reference value of more than 50 
casualties. 
3.2 Utility specification and hypothesis testing 
In the following, only reference dependency for the casualty attribute is tested. In 
more complex models (not reported here), we simultaneously tested reference dependency 
for the cost and time attributes as well,1 but as the general implication regarding the 
casualty attribute did not change we preferred more straightforward models assuming 
symmetric preferences for the time and cost attributes. 
In the most general specification considered for this paper, the utility functions for 
the left hand-side alternative (LS) and the right hand-side (RS) alternative were specified 
as follows: 
 (1)         𝑉𝐿𝑆 = 𝛽0,𝐿𝑆 + 𝛽𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑆 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗  𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝐿𝑆 
                          +𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 ∗  𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐿𝑆
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗  𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑆
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆  
                𝑉𝑅𝑆 =                𝛽𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸 ∗  𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐸𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗  𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑆 
                        + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 ∗  𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑅𝑆
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑆
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 
The parameter 𝛽0,𝐿𝑆 is a constant term intended to capture a possible propensity towards 
the left side alternative. 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 represents the weight put on losses, which is expected to 
                                                 
1 For the time attribute we found substantial reference dependency (loss aversion) while for the cost attribute 
no significant differences could be detected. 
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be negative. 𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁, on the other hand, is the weight put on gains (meaning fewer 
fatalities) and is therefore expected to be positive. For linear models (i.e. when 
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁and 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 are fixed to unity), the two weights correspond to the marginal 
utility of losses and gains. In the non-linear models (where the lambda terms are estimated) 
the marginal utility also depends on the exponents.  
In this paper we are particularly interested in comparing the absolute values of the 
coefficients (|𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆|, |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁|). Five model versions with different value functions 
are specified, where model (1), stated above, is the fifth (M5); the others are as follows: 
M1: As (1) but assuming |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| = |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁| and 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 = 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 1  
M2: As (1) but assuming 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 = 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 1 
M3: As (1) but assuming  |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| = |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁|   and 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 = 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 
M4: As (1) but assuming  𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 = 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠   
The null hypothesis underlying the test of loss aversion is:  
H10:  |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| = |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁|  
We test therefore if the impact on utility (negative for losses, positive for gains) is sensitive 
to whether road safety deteriorates or increases compared to the status quo. We expect 
|𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| > |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁| implying that losses should result in higher disutility than 
corresponding (i.e. equally high) gains in utility.  
With a second hypothesis, we test whether the lambda terms 
(λCAS_GAIN, λCAS_LOSS) are equal to one: 
 H20: 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 = 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 = 1  
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We expect decreasing marginal returns (diminishing sensitivity for losses and gains), e.g. 
values lower than 1, as implied by the sigmoid form (S-shaped form) proposed by prospect 
theory as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 For hypothesis testing, we used the Likelihood ratio (LR) tests, i.e. statistical tests 
that compare the relative performance (in terms of goodness-of-fit as measured by the final 
log-likelihood statistic) of a model that is a restricted version of a more general model 
(Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011, page 279). 
In the case of models M2 and M1 we test for asymmetric preferences given linear 
value functions. If H10 is rejected at the 95% confidence level and if |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| >
|𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁|, we would conclude that loss aversion (given linear value functions) is present 
in our data. Testing M5 against M3 is the main test for asymmetric preferences in non-
linear value functions. As the marginal effect of losses and gains depends on both the beta 
and lambda terms in the nonlinear models, one cannot infer loss aversion from asymmetry 
based on the beta parameters only. Therefore, the test for loss aversion will be a LR test 
between M4 and M3 (i.e. assuming generic exponents for losses and gains). Then the 
conclusion about loss aversion will again be based on the LR test and the absolute size of 
the weights between losses and gains. Attempting to be on the safe side, we performed an 
additional LR-test between M5 and M4 to check if indeed generic exponents for losses and 
gains could be assumed. 
On the other hand, a LR test between M3 and M1 tests H20. If H20 is rejected 
and if lambda is found to be lower than unity we can conclude that also diminishing 
sensitivity is present in our data set. 
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3.3 The survey 
The survey, carried out during late April and the beginning of May, 2010, was 
administered by e-mail to an Internet panel of respondents maintained by a major polling 
firm in Norway. It was sent out in two waves and the survey item dealing with the 
valuation of changes in the number of seriously/severely injured and killed people 
(henceforth termed “casualties”) going by car was part of the second wave. In this second 
wave 3,109 car drivers participating in the first wave were asked to participate in a safety 
valuation survey in a hypothetical route choice context; 75.33% completed this second 
wave of the survey, that is, 2,342 individuals (as the response rate to the first wave was 
about 22%, the effective response rate for the second wave of the survey can then be 
calculated as 75.33% of 22%, yielding about 16.5% of those invited to the first wave of the 
survey). 
The respondents were invited to the second wave (just a week or so after 
responding to the first wave part) by an e-mail from the polling firm referring to their 
participation in the first wave. It was stated that the topic of the second wave was health, 
safety and security, and that it was not quite as comprehensive as the first wave survey 
part. The invited persons were also informed that their answers would contribute to 
transport policy and by their participation taking part in a draw for a prize (four travel gift 
tokens worth 10,000 Norwegian kroner each, or about 1250 Euro, applying the average 
exchange rate of 2010). The first two questions of the survey referred to the reference 
journey that they stated in relation to the first wave survey, asking if they remembered 
being asked about this journey and if it was correct that it was a journey by car on a date X 
with travel purpose Y, with travel time equal to #base_time# minutes and travel cost equal 
to #base_cost# Norwegian kroner. These questions were intended to assure a correct 
linkage from the first to the second wave, as well as reminding the respondents about their 
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reported reference journey. The next questions before the CE introduced the issue of 
casualty risk, asking the respondents if they knew the number of fatalities in road accidents 
per year, describing different levels of injury severity and asking if they themselves had 
been injured in road accidents. The respondents were then asked about the traffic density 
on their reported itinerary, for the possibility of adjusting the annual average daily traffic, 
and then presenting the estimated annual casualty base level (#base_cost#) for their 
reference trip (see Table 2), asking if they thought it was about right, too high or too low. 
After being asked about how many trips the respondents carried out on the itinerary of 
their reference trip, they were presented an introduction to the CE (shown in Figure 2) as 
described in Textbox 1. 
 
Textbox 1 about here (Caption: “Textbox 1: Introduction to the choice experiment) 
 
3.4 A measure of the credibility of the specified casualty risk reference level 
Prospect theory implies that respondents are aware of their reference values and consider 
them in their decision-making. As the reference values for the casualty attribute were 
assigned to respondents, we cannot be certain that they internalized these values. 
Presumably, a critical question relates to whether or not respondents regarded the assigned 
casualty reference levels as realistic. In Veisten et al. (2013, Table 3) the following figures 
were presented: 52% of the respondents perceived the assigned reference levels as “too 
high”, while only 4% regarded them as “too low”, and 35% stated that the assigned 
reference level seemed correct for the route they had driven. Investigating this a bit further, 
we found that the share considering the (calculated) reference as “too high” was highest for 
the shorter trip lengths with lower reference values (six casualties and below). Thus, e.g., 
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five or six casualties annually on a short route were perceived as more unrealistic than 30-
40 casualties on a longer route. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The final sample consisted of 2,290 respondents (52 respondents always choosing the “opt 
out” / “do not know” option, see Figure 2, were deleted from analysis) and, with six 
choices per respondents this implies 13,740 choice observations. These include the cases 
where the “do-not-know” alternatives were chosen. Deleting the choice observations with 
“do-not-know” (which will be left out from statistical analysis in correspondence with 
Veisten et al. 2013), yields 13,334 observations. Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 
chosen alternative with respect to casualties, time and cost.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 shows that for casualties and time, the alternatives with the reference values 
were chosen only slightly more often than the non-reference values (51.1% 
(38.2%+12.9%) versus 48.9% (11.6%+37.7%) for casualties, and 53.4% versus 46.6% for 
the time attribute), while for cost, the alternatives with reference values were chosen 
slightly less often (48.4% versus 51.6%). Not surprisingly, the reference value for 
casualties was chosen more often when the rejected alternative implied a loss, i.e. it was 
the more dangerous alternative (N=5088), compared to choice situations where the rejected 
alternative implied a gain (N=1728). Similarly, 4,977 of the chosen alternatives implied a 
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gain with respect to safety (casualty reduction), while only 1,551 chosen alternatives 
implied a loss with respect to safety. Hence, 75% (i.e. (5,088 + 4,977)/13,334) of the 
chosen alternatives were associated with the lower number of casualties The propensity 
towards choosing the least-casualty alternatives was apparently so strong that it drove 
respondents to select more losses than gains with respect to the travel time attribute. There 
were barely any differences between the shares of alternatives implying losses and gains in 
terms of costs As apparent from these descriptive statistics, it seems that the absolute 
number of casualties is the main driver in the observed choose behaviour, while the choice 
between reference value and non-reference value in itself seems to play only a minor role.   
     
4.2 Estimation Results 
We estimated both Multinomial logit (MNL) and error components mixed logit (ML) 
models (Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011, Chapter 7) following the error specification chosen 
in Veisten et al. (2013). As both models gave the same indications for the LR tests 
described above, we only present the MNL model results here as they are easier to 
interpret. 
     
4.2.1. All respondents  
In this section we estimate the model versions M1-M5 on the whole sample, i.e. regardless 
of whether the respondents perceived the casualty reference level as realistic or not (this is 
altered in the consecutive subsection). Table 3 displays the MNL model results for the five 
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different model specifications (i.e. value function for the casualty attribute) described in 
section 3.22. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
All parameters have the expected signs and are significantly different from zero (except the 
left-side alternative specific constant that was expected to be zero). The lambda values are 
statistically different from unity whenever they are estimated. The goodness-of-fit, as 
indicated by the final log-likelihood (LL) statistic, increases, as expected, with the 
inclusion of more parameters. The largest jump is from model 2 to model 3, i.e., when 
moving from a linear to a non-linear value function. 
An indication of loss aversion can be seen from the fact that the coefficient for 
losses is greater (in absolute terms) than the coefficient for gains. In model 2 the estimated 
values are 0.399 versus 0.350 implying that losses are valued 14% higher than 
corresponding gains, while in model 4, the difference is 1.09 versus 0.989 implying that 
the losses are valued 10.2% higher than gains. In model 5 the difference is 1.08 versus 
1.00, however here the relative impact of losses depends on the size of the losses/gains as 
the lambda values differ.     
As indicated above, LR tests were performed to get formal statements about loss 
aversion. Interpreting M1 as a restricted version of M2, we calculated the LR-test statistic 
                                                 
2 The robust t-test statistics adjust partly for the repeated choices structure of the data by means of the ‘Panel 
Data’ section in BIOGEME (Bierlaire 2003). Note that the robust-t-test statistics are not used for hypothesis 
test. As mentioned above the seldom selected “opt out” (“do not know”) choices were discarded in all 
models. 
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to be 12.8. This is greater than 3.84 (the critical value for one degree of freedom - one 
restriction - at the 95% confidence level). Hence, we reject H10:  |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆| = |𝛽𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁| 
and conclude that there exists loss aversion (given constant rate of returns). As stated 
above, losses are weighted 14% higher than the corresponding gains. Interpreting M3 as a 
restricted version of M4, the LR-test statistic is 10.3; hence we also find evidence for 
asymmetric preferences under diminishing sensitivity. As the very low LR-test statistic 
between M5 and M4 indicates that the lambda values for losses and gains are statistically 
equal we also conclude that we have found loss aversion with the LR-ratio test between 
M4 and M3. Thus, loss aversion - despite relative small in size (10-14%) - is a significant 
feature of the estimated value function.  
Notwithstanding, the hypothesis of constant rate of returns, H20: 𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐺𝐴𝐼𝑁 =
𝜆𝐶𝐴𝑆_𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 = 1, is clearly rejected (M3 versus M1), thus providing a clear indication of 
diminishing sensitivity. Figure 3 depicts the implied value function of models versions 1-5. 
 
Figure 3 about here (Captions: “Figure 3: The value functions, models M1 – M5”) 
 
4.2.2. Segmentation of respondents according to whether or not the assigned 
reference value is perceived as realistic  
As mentioned above only 35% of the respondents regarded the assigned casualty 
reference number as correct. An interesting analysis is whether the relative gap between 
the beta-coefficients for losses and gains differs between the subgroup finding the casualty 
reference correct (realistic) and the sub-group finding it unrealistic (mostly too high; and 
we also include the 9% answering “do not know” in this subgroup). One would presume 
that reference dependency (and loss aversion) is greater for those that perceive the 
reference value as realistic. 
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We therefore estimated model versions M1-M5 for both subgroups. Detailed results 
(for the MNL model) are presented in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. As seen from 
those tables we obtained a result showing significant loss aversion for both subgroups, but 
still with some differences. Table 4 below summaries the %-gap between the weights for 
losses and gains (i.e. “the degree of loss aversion”) for the two subgroups. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Clearly, the relative gap between the weights on losses and gains is higher for the 
subgroup that regards the reference value as realistic. For the linear model, the relative gap 
is almost double the size, while the difference between subgroups is somewhat less for the 
non-linear model.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we tested reference dependency, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in a 
discrete choice experiment involving a road safety attribute. The results indicate that the 
respondents’ valuation of changes in road safety fits well to the value-function proposed by 
prospect theory. Based on the data, we can depict a value function that has an S shape 
around the reference point, implying that respondents value losses in safety (i.e. an 
increased number of casualties) higher than gains (i.e. a reduced number of casualties), in 
absolute terms. This finding represents an important behavioural aspect of decision making 
and adds a psychological component to the utility maximization framework that is not 
represented in classical models with symmetric preferences.  
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Loss aversion regarding road safety can be motivated by conative costs of drivers 
related to giving up the level of road safety they are currently endowed with. Even though 
the road safety level does not constitute a real endowment one physically possess, our 
empirical evidence suggest that loss aversion is a significant factor in choice behaviour (at 
least in stated choice experiments). Thus, we believe that the concept of mental 
endowment (Ariely and Simonson 2003) is relevant in our application. 
While loss aversion is found statistically significant, the degree of losses aversion is 
estimated to be relatively small, within the range of 8-19%. Descriptive statistics of choice 
behaviour (Table 2) indicate that reference dependency and loss aversion were only a 
secondary feature of the way respondents made their choices the stated choice 
experiments. Clearly, whether or not an alternative was the safest (regardless of the 
reference values) was the most crucial determinant of the choices made. This is especially 
true for respondents choosing lexicographically with respect to the safety attribute (about 
37%). In spite of this, our LR test indicated that loss aversion is a significant feature of the 
value function for casualties in our data set. The LR test also indicated a strong case for 
diminishing sensitivity with rather low estimated exponents, yielding a strong convexity 
(concavity) for losses (gains).    
      The exact reference point for road safety is hard to obtain because respondents are - in 
general - not aware about road safety statistics (annual number of casualties) for the road 
they are driving on (and thus are not able to report a "correct" reference point). Our 
approach was to inform every respondent about their (presumed) current reference level 
(derived from aggregated statistics) before the start of the choice experiment. Of course, 
this level may be inaccurate and (even if accurate) differ from the respondent's perceived 
level; and indeed only 35% of respondents accepted the assigned reference level as being 
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"correct". The degree of loss aversion for this subgroup was higher, with losses being 
valued around 19% higher than the corresponding gains for the linear model version 
(compared to 14% for the whole sample). This finding is expected under the hypothesis 
that there is indeed reference dependency in respondents’ choice behaviour. Notably, we 
found also significant loss aversion for the subsample that did not perceive the reference 
value as realistic. It might be the case that respondents adapted to the assigned reference 
value even though it was (initially) perceived as too high or too low. The finding might 
however also indicate that some sort of mental accounting was done by some respondents, 
in a sense that they had a slight propensity to choose the alternative with the more familiar 
(more frequently appearing) attribute value (the reference value appeared in all six choice 
tasks while the two levels for losses and for gains appeared generally not more often than 
twice). Notwithstanding, the degree of loss aversion (estimated at 10%) was considerably 
lower for this subgroup. Psychologically this might be explained as follows: the negative 
feeling connected to giving up the “possession” (conative component) was not active for 
these respondents; they might not have felt (mentally) endowed with the assigned reference 
level of road safety.  
The alternatives in our choice experiment involved deterministic attribute values and 
are, therefore, not applicable to estimate probability weighting functions as in the 
"cumulative prospect theory" approach (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). A possible 
direction of future research could be to design the road safety attribute in such a way that a 
probability distribution about possible outcomes (annual number of casualties) would be 
given in the choice experiments. Then, one could assign probabilities to losses and gains 
and could test (besides loss aversion) whether different weights would be given to small 
versus large probabilities.     
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Our discrete choice experimental data were analysed in parameter space, which has 
been the standard approach for stated choices, but they could alternatively have been 
analysed in willingness-to-pay (WTP) space, by modelling directly the ratio of the casualty 
parameter and the cost parameter (Train and Weeks 2005). A difference between 
willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for road safety deterioration and WTP for 
safety improvement also follows from prospect theory. Thus, although analysing reference 
dependence and loss aversion in parameter space, we might assert that our results are 
consistent with findings from Guria et al. (1999) that found considerably higher values of a 
statistical life when risk was increased than when it was reduced. A meta-analysis of SP 
studies on the valuation of transport safety by de Blaeij et al. (2003), confirmed the WTA-
WTP disparity, yielding a 20% higher WTA than WTP for a given risk change. Horowitz 
and McConnell (2002), assessing WTA/WTP ratios from 45 studies involving a wide 
range of goods, found highest ratios for health/safety goods, together with (other) 
public/non-market goods. 
Standard economic theory relates SP and WTP/WTA to Hicks compensating and 
equivalent variations/surpluses for use in cost-benefit analysis, resting on the axioms and 
assumptions of consumer behaviour. With prospect theory, we are not aware of similar 
measures that can be derived in a consistent fashion. Thus, we might face two non-optimal 
alternatives: i) sticking to the nice microeconomic theory of consumer behaviour that is 
consistent with cost-benefit analysis, but seemingly fails in terms of describing people’s 
actual behaviour; and ii) selecting another behavioural theory, like prospect theory, that 
apparently describes behaviour better but lacks the microeconomic foundation linking the 
analysis of values to cost-benefit analysis. However, if we take a pragmatic approach to 
this dilemma, what would be the implications from reference-dependent valuation of road 
safety? If a prospect-theory based modelling of preferences could yield acceptable inputs 
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to cost-benefit analysis, a main policy indication would be to apply separate values for 
policy that (implicitly) deteriorate road safety versus policy that improves safety. For 
example, if we can assume that the existing official valuation of a statistical life, that is 
symmetric for gains and losses (about 30 mill Norwegian kroner, NOU (2012), or about 4 
mill Euro), yields an approximately correct average of the values for safety improvements 
(gains) and deteriorations (losses), it will represent an overestimation of the value of a gain 
(WTP) and an underestimation of the value of (avoiding) a loss (WTA compensation).  
The diminishing sensitivity, a decreasing marginal value for both gains and losses, 
can be considered, to some extent, as expected from standard economic theory (Rollins and 
Lyke 1998); but might be exaggerated in SP surveys, the so-called “insensitivity to scope” 
phenomena (Carson and Mitchell 1993, Hammitt and Graham 1999). The value function of 
prospect theory implies that the WTP for many small improvements in safety is larger than 
the WTP for an equivalent single large improvement. This follows from the concavity of 
the value function in the domain of gains. The implication from this non-linearity of the 
value function is that estimated unit values, e.g., related to the value of a statistical life, 
will depend on the size (scope) of the changes presented in SP studies. Thus, the size of the 
impact of a policy measure, in addition to the direction of the safety change, should be 
taken into account. 
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Table 1. The casualty attribute; the levels of severe/serious injuries and fatalities, in the stated 
choice experiment (CE) 
      
Base, fatalities and 
severe/serious injuries 
Reference 
trip time 
interval 
Casualty attribute level (relative to base, fatalities and 
severe/serious injuries) 
AADT 
12000 
AADT 
6000 
AADT 
2000 
(min) level -2 level -1 level 0 level 1 level 2 Car-12 Car-6 Car-2 
 10 - 19 -2 -1 0 1 2 4 3 2 
 20 - 44 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 8 6 5 
 45 - 74 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 14 11 6 
 75 - 119 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 21 16 8 
 120 - 179 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 35 26 14 
 180 - 239 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 49 37 20 
 240 - 359 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 70 53 28 
 360 - 539 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 106 79 42 
 540 - 1439 -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 232 174 93 
 1440 + -30% -15% 0 15% 30% 352 264 141 
Source: Veisten et al. (2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 3 
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Table 2. Characteristics of chosen alternatives 
Attributes Attribute levels Frequency Percent 
Casualty 
 Reference casualty (versus a 
more dangerous route)   
5088 38.2 
  Reference casualty (versus a 
safer route)   
1718 12.9 
  Loss casualty  1551 11.6 
  Gain casualty 4977 37.3 
 Total 13334 100 
Time 
 Reference time  (versus a 
slower route)  
3139 23.5 
  Reference time (versus a 
faster route)  
3986 29.9 
  Loss time  3513 26.3 
  Gain time 2696 20.2 
 Total 13334 100 
Cost 
 Reference cost (versus a 
more expensive route)  
3230 24.2 
  Reference cost (versus a 
cheaper route)  
3220 24.1 
  Loss cost  3411 25.6 
  Gain cost 3473 26.0 
 Total 13334 100 
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Table 3. Multinomial logit modelling results, M1-M5 
All choice types; all 
respondents 
M1 (linear, 
symmetric) 
M2 (linear, 
asymmetric) 
M3 (non-linear, 
symmetric) 
M4 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
M5 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
Parameter Name Value robust 
t-test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust 
t-test 
value robust 
t-test 
ASC_left -0.0064 0.73 -0.0066 0.73 -0.0061 -0.28 -0.00634 0.30 -0.0064 0.77 
B_cost -0.0151 -8.58 -0.0152 -8.66 -0.0105 -7.41 -0.0105 -7.42 -0.0105 -7.42 
B_time -0.0466 -11.76 -0.0469 -11.79 -0.0320 -9.82 -0.0321 -9.84 -0.0322 -9.84 
B_cas_loss -0.373 -15.15 -0.399 -14.52 -1.04 -28.14 -1.09 -26.41 -1.08 -24.36 
B_cas_gain 0.373 15.15 0.350 13.40 1.04 -28.14 0.989 25.59 1.00 22.69 
Lambda_cas_loss 1 --fixed-- 1 --fixed-- 0.321 10.37 0.322 10.44 0.334 9.86 
Lambda_cas_gain 1 --fixed-- 1 --fixed-- 0.321 10.37 0.322 10.44 0.307 7.91 
No of parameters a 4 
 
5  5 6 
 
7 
No of observation   13334   13334  13334   13334   13334 
No of respondents 
 
2290 
 
2290  2290 
 
2290 
 
2290 
Null LL -9242.425 -9242.425 -9242.425 -9242.425 -9242.425 
Final LL -7841.208 -7834.813 -7137.915 -7132.773 -7132.469 
rho-sq  
 
0.152 
 
0.152  0.228 
 
0.228 
 
0.228 
Adjusted rho-sq  
 
0.151 
 
0.152  0.227 
 
0.228 
 
0.228 
LR Test against M1   
 
12.8 1406.6   
LR Test against M3 
   
    10.3    10.9 
LR Test against M4          0.6 
a Note the restriction B_cas_loss = -B_cas_gain in model M1 and M3, and the restriction 
Lambda_cas_loss=Lambda_cas_gain in model M3 and M4.  
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Table 4. Degree of loss aversion for subgroups with different perception of the realism of the 
assigned casualty risk on their reference trip 
%-increase of weights 
for losses (compared to 
gains) 
All 
respondents 
(N=2290) 
Those who 
perceive 
reference value as 
realistic (N=810) 
Those who 
perceive 
reference value as 
unrealistic 
(N=1480) 
Linear model (M2) 14.0% 19.2% 10.4% 
Non-linear model (M4) 10.2% 13.7% 8.4% 
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Table A1. The 24 choice types (for choices between A and B)a 
Attributes Route A Route B Route A Route B Route A Route B Route A Route B 
 Choices 1-6  Choices 7-12 Choices 13-18 Choices 19-24 
Time Ref Loss Loss Ref Ref Loss Ref Gain 
Cost Ref Loss Ref Loss Loss Ref Ref Gain 
Casualty  Ref Gain Ref Gain Ref Gain Gain Ref 
Time Ref Loss Loss Ref Ref Loss Ref Loss 
Cost Ref Gain Ref Gain Loss Ref Ref Gain 
Casualty  Ref Loss Ref Loss Ref Loss Loss Ref 
Time Ref Gain Loss Ref Ref Gain Ref Gain 
Cost Ref Loss Ref Loss Loss Ref Ref Loss 
Casualty  Ref Loss Ref Loss Ref Loss Loss Ref 
Time Ref Loss Gain Ref Ref Loss Ref Loss 
Cost Ref Gain Ref Gain Gain Ref Ref Gain 
Casualty  Ref Gain Ref Gain Ref Gain Gain Ref 
Time Ref Gain Gain Ref Ref Gain Ref Gain 
Cost Ref Loss Ref Loss Gain Ref Ref Loss 
Casualty  Ref Gain Ref Gain Ref Gain Gain Loss 
Time Ref Gain Gain Ref Ref Gain Ref Loss 
Cost Ref Gain Ref Gain Gain Ref Ref Loss 
Casualty  Ref Loss Ref Loss Ref Loss Loss Ref 
a “Ref” means “reference level” (i.e. the attribute value is as reported or inferred from the reference trip) 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Multinomial Logit modelling results, only respondents that perceive the derived 
reference levels for causalities as realistic  
M1 (linear, 
symmetric) 
M2 (linear, 
asymmetric) 
M3 (non-linear, 
symmetric) 
M4 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
M5 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
Parameter Name Value robust 
t-test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust 
t-test 
value robust 
t-test 
ASC_left -0.0150 -0.46 -0.0146 -0.45 -0.0106 -0.29 -0.0103 -0.28 -0.0103 -0.28 
B_cost 
-0.0106 -3.67 -0.0106 -3.67 -0.0070 -3.65 -0.00691 -3.66 
-
0.00689 -3.63 
B_time -0.0371 -6.40 -0.0372 -6.45 -0.0262 -5.28 -0.0264 -5.32 -0.0265 -5.34 
B_cas_loss -0.340 -8.97 -0.372 -8.74 -1.09 -16.91 -1.16 -16.07 -1.14 -14.30 
B_cas_gain 0.340 -8.97 0.312 8.14 1.09 16.91 1.02 15.15 1.04 13.81 
Lambda_cas_loss 1 -fixed- 1 --fixed-- 0.279 5.71 0.281 5.76 0.293 5.41 
Lambda_cas_gain 1 -fixed- 1 --fixed-- 0.279 5.71 0.281 5.76 0.266 4.42 
No of parameters a 4 
 
5  5 6 
 
7 
No of observation 
 
4745 
 
4745  4745 
 
4745 
 
4745 
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No of respondents 
 
810 
 
810  810 
 
810 
 
810 
Null LL -3288.983 -3288.983 -3288.983 -3288.983 -3288.983 
Final LL -2764.727 -2760.863 -2479.801 2476.531 2476.413 
rho-sq  
 
0.159 
 
0.161  0.246 
 
0.247 
 
0.247 
Adjusted rho-sq  
 
0.158 
 
0.159  0.245 
 
0.245 
 
0.245 
LR Test against M1   
 
7.7 562.1   
LR Test against M3 
  
    6.5  6.8 
LR Test against M4          0.2 
a Note the restriction B_cas_loss = -B_cas_gain in model M1 and M3, and the restriction 
Lambda_cas_loss=Lambda_cas_gain in model M3 and M4.  
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Table A3. Multinomial Logit modelling results, only respondents that perceive the derived 
reference levels for causalities as unrealistic  
M1 (linear, 
symmetric) 
M2 (linear, 
asymmetric) 
M3 (non-linear, 
symmetric) 
M4 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
M5 (non-linear, 
asymmetric) 
Parameter Name Value robust 
t-test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust t-
test 
value robust 
t-test 
value robust 
t-test 
ASC_left -0.00182 -0.08 -0.0021 -0.09 -0.0041 -0.16 -0.0046 -0.17 -0.0046 -0.17 
B_cost -0.0189 -9.41 -0.0189 -9.43 -0.0138 -8.46 -0.0138 -8.50 -0.0138 -8.53 
B_time -0.0537 -10.07 -0.0539 -10.08 -0.0367 -8.50 -0.0368 -8.50 -0.0368 -8.49 
B_cas_loss -0.400 -12.64 -0.421 -11.78 -1.02 -22.57 -1.06 -20.98 -1.04 -19.75 
B_cas_gain 0.400 12.64 0.381 11.06 1.02 22.57 0.977 20.62 0.996 17.96 
Lambda_cas_loss 1 -fixed- 1 --fixed-- 0.353 9.32 0.353 9.40 0.370 8.80 
Lambda_cas_gain 1 -fixed- 1 --fixed-- 0.353 9.32 0.353 9.40 0.334 8.80 
No of parameters a 4 
 
5  5 6 
 
7 
No of observation 
 
8589 
 
8589  8589 
 
8589 
 
8589 
No of respondents 
 
1480 
 
1480  1480 
 
1480 
 
1480 
Null LL -5953.441 -5953.441 -5953.441 -5953.441 -5953.441 
Final LL -5056.286 -5053.677 -4636.711 -4634.264 -4633.919 
rho-sq  
 
0.151 
 
0.151  0.221 
 
0.222 
 
0.222 
Adjusted rho-sq  
 
0.150 
 
0.150  0.220 
 
0.221 
 
0.220 
LR Test against M1   
 
5.2 839.2   
LR Test against M3 
  
    4.9  5.6 
LR Test against M4          0.7 
a Note the restriction B_cas_loss = -B_cas_gain in model M1 and M3, and the restriction 
Lambda_cas_loss=Lambda_cas_gain in model M3 and M4.  
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